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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to eradicate pregnancy discrimination, its history must be
addressed.' Although pregnancy discrimination has existed for centuries,
most scholarly discussion on the subject begins with several key cases
decided in the 1970s and 80s. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court
held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not violate the
Constitution.2 Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the
Court held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.3 The decision in Gilbert prompted
Congress to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA").4 Title VII states that it
t 4 ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SusAN B. ANTHONY, MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE & IDA
HUSTED HARPER, EDS., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 91-92 (1881-1922). (Here-
inafter "HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE"). In 1887, Senator Blair, a supporter of
suffrage argued, "[It is difficult to be tolerant of the objection that woman by reason
of motherhood has no time to vote ... Has the millennium yet dawned?"
B.A. Hiram College, M.A. The Ohio State University, J.D. 2005, University of
Michigan Law School.
1. Reva Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 953 (1985) (hereinafter Siegel, Employment Equality).
2. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
3. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
4. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983): "When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its
disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert deci-
sion." See also Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
Public law 95-555: prepared for the Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
United States Senate (1980) (hereinafter "Legislative History") at 3: "The Pregnancy
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is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual "be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."5
The PDA changed the definition of the terms "because of sex" and "on
the basis of sex" to include "because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical 'conditions. ', 6 In Newport News Shipbuild-
ing and Dry Dock Co. v. EE.0. C, the Supreme Court held that the
PDA required equal treatment of pregnant workers Four years later, in
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, the Court held
that providing pregnant workers with favorable treatment did not vio-
late the PDA.8 These cases interpreting the PDA fueled the debate
among feminists over whether pregnant workers should be treated the
same as other workers (the equality approach) or whether they should
receive special treatment (the difference approach).
Today the equality/difference debate with respect to pregnancy has
been dismissed as "nonproductive,"9 and scholarship now is focused on
whether pregnancy should be covered under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (the disability model)." However, a new way to approach
Discrimination Act was enacted by Congress as a response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Company." In his introductory remarks to the
bill, Senator Williams expressed fear that the Court based its decision in Gilbert on
"the outdated notion that women are only supplemental or temporary workers-
earning 'pin money' or waiting to return home to raise children full-time."
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The legislative history regarding the addition of "sex" is
"meager," Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir.
1975), and "notable primarily for its brevity." Gilbert, 417 U.S. at 143. See also Meri-
tor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("we are left with little legislative
history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based
on 'sex.'"). Supposedly, an opponent introduced the addition of sex in a last minute
effort to sabotage the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
7. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 690 ("The Congressional Record is overflowing with...
statements by individual members of Congress expressing their intention to insure
with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that working women are not treated differ-
ently because of pregnancy. Consistent with these views, all three committee reports
on the bills that led to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act expressly state that the Act
would require employers to treat pregnant employees the same as 'other employ-
ees. ").
8. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
9. Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination
Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 Ma. L. REv. 225, n.17 (1998).
10. See, e.g., Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Ac-
commodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 Gao. L.J. 193
(1993); Amanda G. Wachuta, Note, The ADA Gets Even More Complicated: Analyz-
ing Pregnancy With Complications as a Disability, 52 DRAKE L. Rav. 471 (2004);
Jessica Lynne Wilson, Technology as a Panacea: Why Pregnancy-Related Problems
Should be Defined Without Regard to Mitigating Measures Under the ADA, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 831 (1999).
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the equality/difference debate may be to consider the historical record.
The history of pregnancy discrimination has been largely ignored by the
courts, as Justice Brennan lamented in his dissent in Gilbert: "[T]he
Court simply disregards a history of General Electric practices that have
served to undercut the employment opportunities of women who be-
come pregnant while employed."" The PDA has been enforced
"without critical evaluation of the societal attitudes producing the preg-
nancy exclusions the amendment sought to remedy." 2
The history of working during pregnancy has been relatively unex-
plored. Part of the reason why the history of pregnancy discrimination
has not been addressed may be that it has only become acceptable to
discuss pregnancy openly in the past decade or two. Historical docu-
ments reflect the careful and discrete language that was used to indicate
pregnancy. People discussed pregnancy using a variety of euphemisms,
such as "in a family way" or "with child," and they mentioned "con-
finement"" rather than childbirth. Even in their private journals and
correspondence, women did not mention being pregnant, although they
would note that a birth had occurred. 4 In Muller v. Oregon, where the
Court upheld a maximum hour law for women workers, the Court
stated: "That woman's physical structure and the performance of mater-
nal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon
her."5 This statement can be read to refer to the state of pregnancy, al-
though the "burdens of motherhood" certainly continue after birth.
Opponents of suffrage also considered pregnancy in their arguments:
The office and duty which nature has devolved upon woman
during all the active and vigourous portion of her life would
often render it impossible, and still more often indelicate, for
11. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, dissenting).
12. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, n. 291 (1992) (hereinafter
Siegel, Reasoning From the Body). Congress did consider testimony about the increase
in the number of women in the workforce (Legislative History, supra note 4, at III).
13. "Confinement" was a rather accurate term, considering that women truly were "con-
fined" to the home during pregnancy because it was unseemly for them to appear in
public. See text accompanying notes 56-63, infra.
14. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVO-
LUTION TO THE PRESENT 61 (1980).
15. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1907) (emphasis added).
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her to appear and act in caucuses, conventions or elections, or
to act as a member of the Legislature or as a juror or judge.16
The "active and vigourous portion of her life" probably refers to the
childbearing years, and the use of the term "indelicate" implies that it
would be indecorous and inappropriate for a woman to make the neces-
sary public appearances to participate in the political process while she
was in a "delicate condition" during pregnancy. This particular quota-
tion also refers explicitly to the employment context, since it
contemplates women acting as members of the Legislature or as judges.
Although the History of Woman Sufflage heavily documents women's
participation "in the professions,"'7 nowhere do the authors discuss how
pregnancy and childbearing might have affected this participation.
This Article will focus on what might be considered the "prehis-
tory" of the PDA in an attempt to shed new light on the
equality/difference debate. Beginning as early as the nineteenth century,
pregnant workers have been forced into either the equality approach or
the difference approach depending mostly on race and class. This Article
will show that, at times, both approaches restrained the autonomy of
women and even caused harm to individual women and society by con-
tributing to the development of the stereotypes and social attitudes that
continue to permit pregnancy discrimination today.
Part II examines the pervasive idea that motherhood is women's
natural role, and how childbearing was long considered a marital duty.
Part III discusses the social mores and health concerns that forced preg-
nant women out of the work place. Part IV looks at women who,
instead of being forced out of the work force, were forced to continue
working through their pregnancies. In Part V, I consider several cases
that predate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and how they can inform re-
cent arguments supporting workplace accommodation of pregnancy
using a disability model. 8 In Part VI, I argue that pregnant workers
should not be forced into either a difference model or an equality
model, but rather should be treated on an individual basis taking into
account their capabilities and preferences. The Article concludes with
references to the present day situation of pregnant workers and how the
history of pregnancy discrimination can be used to reform the societal
attitudes that have permitted this injustice for so long.
16. 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (quoting Hon. Luke P. Poland).
17. See, e.g., 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 305.
18. For the sake of brevity as well as my desire not to repeat the extensive literature that
already exists on pregnancy discrimination cases dating from the 1970s onward, I
have limited my discussion to cases that were brought prior to 1964.
[Vol. 12:163
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II. FIRST COMES WORK, THEN COMES MARRIAGE
Traditionally, motherhood was seen as woman's calling and duty. In
1873, Justice Bradley stated,
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life.... The paramount destiny and mission of women
are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the creator."
Seventy-five years later, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Butzel said
that,
where a woman quits work because of pregnancy, it is difficult
to determine when if ever, she will want to return to work. It
becomes her first desire to remain at home and care for her
child, and in only a few cases, where for economic reasons she
must return to work, will she delegate her maternal duties to
someone else.2°
Women's biological capacity to become pregnant has been the basis for
the belief that women are unfit for employment in the public sphere.
Employers commonly argued that they should not have to bear the cost
by paying women benefits when they choose their natural role over their
job.22 Getting married or becoming pregnant signaled that women "were
ready to assume their 'natural' role."
23
Married women have been especially vulnerable to employment
discrimination because of society's expectation that she fulfill her marital
duty by bearing children. 24 A recent article suggested that today, "the
19. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
20. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Mich. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 31 N.W.2d 83, 88
(Mich. 1948) (Butzel, J., dissenting). The majority in this case allowed a woman who
left work due to pregnancy to receive unemployment benefits, reasoning that "she is
no longer pregnant and meets all other eligibility requirements." Id. at 85.
21. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1129 (1986); Siegel, Employment Equal-
ity, supra note 1, at 942.
22. Id. at 1136.
23. Id. at 1122.
24. In the 19th century, a wife's duty to bear children was owed both to her husband out
of marital obligation, as well as to the community. Siegel, Reasoning From the Body,
supra note 12, at 293, 297.
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maternal wall typically arises at one of three points: when a woman gets
pregnant; when she becomes a mother; or when she begins working ei-
ther part-time or on a flexible work arrangement."25 This list neglects to
mention an important point preceding any of those-when a woman
becomes a wife.26 In the 1860s, the commonly held belief was that "mar-
riage appropriately terminated wage work., 27 In the 1880s, married
women were expected to stay home if their husbands earned a sufficient
21income. 8 In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, "doctors openly
denounced the concept of two-career marriage," of course meaning that
a wife belonged in the home.29 In fact, between 1890 and 1920, "[t]he
acceptance of gainful employment of women was predicated to a great
extent on the belief that they would and should retire to the home after
marriage." 0 From 1910 to 1940, the societal understanding was that
women would work in low-end jobs without advancement, and then
leave the workforce after marriage. 1 General Electric's explanation of
why the disability benefits plan it implemented in 1926 excluded female
employees provides an illustration of this attitude: "'women did not rec-
ognize the responsibilities of life, for they probably were hoping to get
married soon and leave the company.' 3 2 Until the mid-1960s, married
women stood little chance of being hired.3
While white, middle-class, American-born women were expected
not to work after marriage, working-class women and black women
were not judged if they continued working after they married. As histo-
rian Lois Scharf observes, "[c]lass distinctions also marked the
opposition to working wives." 34 It was more acceptable for working-class
women to work out of economic necessity, than for business and profes-
25. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall Relieffrr Family Care-
givers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 78
(2003).
26. A wedding ring itself can be a signal that a woman plans to have children. This con-
nection still exists, causing women to contemplate removing their wedding rings
before job interviews to avoid "bias on the basis of maternity." See FELICE N.
SCHWARTZ, BREAKING WITH TRADITION 9-26 (1992).
27. ALICE KESSLER-HARIs, OUT TO WORK 71 (1982) (hereinafter KESSLER-HAMIS,
OUT TO WORK). It also reflected poorly on a husband if his wife worked, because it
was assumed that he was incapable of supporting his family himself. This assumption
no doubt contributed to some men's discriminatory attitudes toward working
women.
28. Id. at 98.
29. Siegel, Reasoning From the Body, supra note 12, at 310.
30. Lois SCHuF, To WORK AND To WED 17 (1980).
31. KESSLER-HALs, OUT TO WORK, supra note 27, at 249.
32. Quoted in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 150, n.1 (Brennan, dissenting).
33. Finley, supra note 21, at 1123.
34. ScHARF, supra note 30, at 38.
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sional women "who supposedly worked because they desired an outlet
for their energies and talents, needed the psychological gratification, and
deserved the enhanced status that derived from paid work."35
Married black women have historically had high work rates. In the
decades after the Civil War, the number of African-American women
participating in the work force rose dramatically, including married
women." Part of the reason for this phenomenon was the lack of job
opportunities for black men after the Civil War, coupled with a steady
demand for black women to work as private household servants, espe-
cially in the South. 7 But this high rate of participation in the workforce
was not necessarily a voluntary choice: "For the most part, black wives
and mothers throughout this nation's history have been forced to labor
outside their homes-forced first by slaveholders and then by the threat
of starvation and homelessness that plagued their families after emanci-
pation."" But "[e]ven where family income, husband's employment, and
demographic factors are held constant, black women were still far more
likely to work than white women."'" The fact that black women are an
exception to the rule of leaving employment upon marriage also suggests
that for them, "[piregnancy is to receive no special status in the work-
place."4°
A case arising in Ohio in 1953, Neff v. Board of Review, Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation,4 illustrates the deeply entrenched belief
that pregnancy was a natural part of the marital role. Neffinterpreted an
unemployment statute that stated: "... no individual may ... be paid
benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to
which the administrator finds that such individual quit work to marry,- • ,,42
or because of marital, parental, filial or other domestic obligations. In
1952, this statute was amended with the addition of the words "or be-
came unemployed because of pregnancy."43 The Neff court held that
"[t]he pregnancy of a married woman is clearly a condition arising out
of 'marital, parental, filial or other domestic obligations.' To hold oth-
erwise would disregard established laws and customs involving the
35. Id. at 37-38.
36. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK, supra note 27, at 123.
37. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW 112-113 (1985).
38. Id. at 323.
39. KFSSLER-HA s, OUT TO WORK, supra note 27, at 123.
40. LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB 13, 41 (1993).
41. Neff v. Bd. of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 117 N.E.2d 533, 536
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1953).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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family. Insofar as a married woman is concerned, the amendment ...
did not change existing laws., 44 This same view was echoed by courts in
other parts of the country some years later.45
III. THEN COMES BABY IN A BABY CARRIAGE
If women did not leave employment upon marriage, they left upon
46pregnancy. Some left voluntarily, while others left because they knew
they would be discharged once the pregnancy was revealed.47 Many em-
ployers required women to leave upon learning of the pregnancy, and
would not rehire them for a year or two following the birth, if at all.
48
Some women were fired outright, and others were relegated to lower
ranking jobs.49 However, the absence of maternity leave policies usually
forced women to quit work without any other options. °
The common assumption was that pregnant women were disen-
gaged from the workplace, and so they belonged at home.51 One woman
who became pregnant in 1947 explained that she "quit her job without
even bothering to ask her boss for permission to continue working, since
it was mutually understood that women would stop working when they
became pregnant."52 In the 1950s and 60s, many employers had manda-
tory leave policies requiring women to leave work upon reaching a
certain month of pregnancy, regardless of whether they were able and
willing to continue working." As late as 1960, women were still com-
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Luke v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm., 123 So.2d 231, 234 (Miss.
1960) ("It is clear therefore that pregnancy of a married woman is clearly a condition
arising out of 'marital, filial, and domestic circumstances and obligations.' To hold
otherwise would destroy established laws and customs involving the family.").
46. SCHAR, supra note 30, at 107. By the 194 0s, labor statistics "indicat[ed] that young
women were increasingly less likely to retire upon marriage ... but waited until the
birth of their first child."
47. SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, ALFRED J. KAHN, & PAUL KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES
AND WORKING WOMEN 34 (1983).
48. Elizabeth D. Koontz, Childbirth and Childrearing Leave: Job-Related Benefits,
N.Y.L.F. 480 (1971).
49. Finley, supra note 21, at 1123.
50. Id.
51. Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 335 (1984-85).
52. KAMERMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 1-2.
53. Id. at 35. It was not until 1974 that the Supreme Court struck down mandatory
maternity leaves imposed regardless of a woman's ability or desire to work. See Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 14 U.S. 632 (1974).
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monly fired if they became pregnant." In 1964, pregnancy was the most
frequently reported reason why married women under age thirty-five
quit work.
5
Policies requiring mandatory leaves of absence during pregnancy
were an outgrowth of the Victorian view that it was obscene for a preg-
nant woman to be seen in public.5 6 Having an obviously pregnant
woman present in the workplace caused embarrassment and discomfort
for other employees 7.5 This view derived from the fact that "pregnancy is
an obvious manifestation of one kind of female sexuality '"" Perhaps
some women simply quit their jobs upon pregnancy to avoid an uncom-
fortable conversation with their employers. As late as the 1950s,
pregnant women consciously avoided appearing in public places." It was
not until after the 1952-53 television season, when Lucille Ball ap-
peared on "I Love Lucy" during her pregnancy, that views began to
change.60 However, the courts continued to consider the issue of public
contact when deciding cases involving a pregnant woman working. In
1957, a New York court reversed a decision denying unemployment
61
compensation to a woman who had been discharged due to pregnancy.
The court stated that:
the claimant's pregnancy did not interfere with her ability to
perform the kind of work in which she had been engaged. Her
work was primarily of a research character and did not require
contact with the public, so that her advanced stage of preg-
nancy did not of itself disqualify her from such employment.
The claimant's doctor had certified that she was capable of
working until delivery. The Board based its decision [denying
compensation] upon its holding in another case that a woman
in an advanced stage of pregnancy was not available for work
54. Williams, supra note 51, at 335.
55. Finley, supra note 21, at n.18, citing a Bureau of Labor Statistics Study.
56. Koontz, supra note 48, at 481.
57. KAmERMAN aT AL., supra note 47, at 38.
58. Finley, supra note 21, at 1134.
59. See DEGLER, supra note 14, at 59.
60. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of Paternal Bonding in
the Law of Family Relations, 33 Ir. L. REv. 694-97 (2000) for a detailed discussion
of how Lucy's pregnancy was handled on the television program. As an actress on a
popular television program, Ball was certainly the most visible woman working dur-
ing pregnancy; see also Marc Mory & Lia Pistilli, The Failure of the Family and
Medical Leave Act: Alternative Proposals for Contemporary American Families, 18 HoF-
STRA LAB. & EMp. L.J. 689, 691 n.15 (2001).
61. Evens v. Lubin, 168 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
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as a saleswoman requiring contact with the public. That hold-ing was ..... u. - :_. ,:, -_ case
Presumably, if the claimant's work had involved contact with the public,
the court would have reached the opposite result. In a 1962 Ohio case,
an waitress was forced to apply for a leave of absence when, after reveal-
ing her early stage of pregnancy, her employer told her "that she could
not continue working because her appearance was unseemly.,
63
Women faced a double bind because pregnancy forced them out of
jobs, and at the same time made them ineligible for unemployment
compensation. In the 1930s, legislation in four states disqualified
women from receiving unemployment insurance benefits if their em-
ployers' discriminatory policies forced them to leave the workplace upon
marriage."4 In 1960, thirty-five states excluded pregnant women from
unemployment insurance benefits. 65 These laws indicate that while
working after marriage was frowned upon, working after pregnancy was
much worse.
Most of the pregnancy discrimination cases brought before 1964
dealt with unemployment compensation. Pregnant women were consid-
ered unavailable for work for a set period of time before and after
childbirth, whether or not they were willing to work. If they were un-
able to find work after this period had expired, they were still ineligible
for benefits because they had left work without "good cause." For exam-
ple, a South Dakota court denied benefits to a woman who had resigned
62. Id.
63. Leach v. Bd. of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 184 N.E.2d 704, 705
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962).
64. ScHARu, supra note 30, at 129.
65. KAmERMAN ET AtL., supra note 47, at 37. See also Siegel, Employment Equality, supra
note 1, at n.63. ("Pregnancy was excluded from state unemployment insurance cov-
erage, on the presumption that the pregnant woman was no longer an active
candidate in the labor market-a statutory presumption that prevailed until prohib-
ited by federal law." See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12)
(1982) (no person shall be denied unemployment compensation by state law solely
on the basis of pregnancy)"). In Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n,
479 U.S. 511, 512-13 (1987), the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a woman who had taken a leave of absence from work because
of her pregnancy, and was told that no openings were available when she was ready to
return to work. The Court held that § 3304(a)(12) only prohibits discrimination and
does not mandate preferential treatment for pregnant women, and it was not relevant
that she left work due to pregnancy. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 517. For criticism of this
decision, see Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond Analyzing the Refisal to Award
Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior Employment Due to
Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U.L. REv. 532 (1988); Elizabeth F. Thompson, Unemployment
Compensation: Women and Children-The Denials, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 751 (1992).
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due to pregnancy on March 26, 194 1.66 She had the baby on July 19,
1941.67 After recovering from "her confinement," as the court put it, she
applied for reinstatement and was rejected.68 The court said that she
"was justified in leaving her employment, but it does not follow that she
was entitled to unemployment benefits., 69 The court refused to hold
that she "voluntarily" left her position, but at the same time decided she
left her employment "without good cause. 70
In addition to the social mores that deemed it inappropriate for
pregnant women to appear in public, common medical beliefs were
thought to justify the exclusion of women from the workplace. Not only
did women harm themselves and their future offspring by working, they
also threatened the stability of American society. In 1905, a member of
the American Federation of Labor stated that "if women labor in facto-
ries and similar institutions they bring forth weak children who are not
educated to become strong and good citizens."71
The dominant medical theory in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century advised that pregnancy should be a period of "intense
mental vacuity" to avoid "prenatal impressions."72 It was believed that
the brain and the uterus competed for energy and nutrients, and, there-
fore, the pregnant woman must avoid mental efforts or risk insanity.7 In
order to prevent deformity, pregnant women were to avoid intellectual
stimulation and all "shocking, painful or unbeautiful sights." 74 Pregnant
women were also advised to avoid lust, anger, aggression, and mental or
physical overexertion.75 Women who did not comport themselves prop-
erly under these theories would be judged negatively by society.
Women's employment, particularly overwork, was blamed for a
whole host of detriments to health, including pelvic and uterine disease,
infant mortality, miscarriage, and premature births. Working prolonged
hours supposedly caused inflammation in the pelvis and rendered women
sterile or permanently invalid.76 One New York medical inspector said
66. John Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 13 N.W.2d 498, 500 (S.D.
1944).
67. Id. at 499.
68. Id. at 500.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK, supra note 27, at 154.
72. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD 114 (1978).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 100.
75. MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA 267 (1975).
76. Louis D. BRANDEIS & JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 37 (1908).
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that overwork of the expectant mother was known to cause evil effects.77
Overwork at any time in a woman's life, even before marriage and preg-
nancy, was said to have a disastrous effect upon childbirth.78
The famous "Brandeis brief" of 1907 catalogued many undesirable
consequences affecting women's health and childbearing capabilities.79
Among the problems caused by working conditions that required stand-
ing and exposure to heat were "displacement, flexions, and versions of
the uterus," pelvic disease, and difficulty in childbirth. ° Brandeis
blamed an increase in the need for "instrumental delivery" on the num-
bers of women working during pregnancy."
Wage labor was believed to increase the rate of infant mortality.
The evidence that infant mortality was caused by the mother's employ-
ment was simply that "infant mortality is highest in towns where
women are employed in large numbers.812 This evidence ignores the
many other causes of infant mortality that could be present, particularly
in densely populated areas. The children born to mothers who worked
during pregnancy were said to be more susceptible to disease.83 The
closer to delivery that the pregnant woman worked, the greater the sup-
posed harm:
An occupation requiring a woman to stand during the greater
part of the day when continued up to within a few days or
even hours of the time of parturition, must act to the detri-
ment of the offspring, and there is less chance of the latter
coming into the world fully grown, well formed, and in good
health.
84
A 1915 report stated: "The variations in still birth rates and the mortal-
ity from early infancy in relation to the interval of rest before
confinement indicate the importance of the mother's ceasing her em-
ployment outside the home at least two weeks before her
77. ELIZABETH F. BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION 256 (1925).
78. BRANDEIS, supra note 76, at 36.
79. Id. Before becoming a Supreme Court justice himself, Louis Brandeis wrote a brief to
the Court using social science data to support the maximum hour law for women
workers at issue in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Since then, briefs that
rely on social science data have been called "Brandeis briefs."
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id. at 38-39.
82. BAKER, supra note 77, at 254.
83. BRANDEIS, supra note 76, at 38.
84. Id. at 4 2.
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confinement."85 The Factory Investigating Commission also found fac-
tory labor responsible for prematurity and infant mortality.86
In the 1920s and 30s, supporters of protective labor legislation for
women cited these types of harm to support the passage of maximum
hour laws and prohibitions against night work.87 Ideas began to change
during World War II when women were needed in industry while the
men were abroad. In 1942, the Women's Bureau issued "Standards for
Maternity Care and Employment of Mothers in Industry," saying a
pregnant woman should give first consideration to her own health and
the health of the child, but may find it necessary to work.88
During World War II, record numbers of women began working
outside of the home as part of the war effort.89 Although women were
recruited to work during the war through media efforts glorifying "Rosie
the Riveter," for example, the war did not change general attitudes
about the employment of married women and mothers. ° The Man-
power Commission stated that: "The first responsibility of women with
young children, in war as in peace, is to give suitable care in their own
homes to their children."' The Women's Bureau of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor was still recommending that pregnant women leave work
six weeks before delivery and remain on leave for two months after
childbirth. 92 In 1942-43, women were still commonly fired when they
became pregnant, or required to take an unpaid leave of absence.93 Dur-
ing this period, however, working during pregnancy was probably not as
much of a concern since most of the men were abroad.94
Many women left their jobs (voluntarily and involuntarily) when
the war ended.95 Young women who had been employed continued to
85. BAKER, supra note 77, at 256 (quoting a study in Baltimore on births in 1915).
86. Id. at 257.
87. PROTECTING WOMEN 347 (Ulla Wikander et al. eds., 1995). Such a law does not
account for women who would prefer to work evening shifts when their husband or
other family members are available to provide childcare.
88. KAMERMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 34.
89. RYAN~, supra note 75, at 316-17 ("8 million women entered the work force during
WWII ... seventy-five percent of the new workers were married").
90. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAvE ALWAYS WORKED 142 (1981).
91. LYNN Y. WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER 111 (1985).
92. Finley, supra note 21, at n.20. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 334.
93. KAMERMAN ET At., supra note 47, at 35.
94. See DEGLER, supra note 14, at 421 (noting the "fall in the birth rate consequent upon
the husband's absence").
95. RYAN, supra note 75, at 319 (by the end of the war, many women were fired and
employers resumed old discriminatory policies). See also U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S
HISTORY 299 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995) (economic and employment gains
made during W WII were "snatched away in the postwar period").
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leave their jobs at marriage. Women resumed their "natural roles" as
wives and mothers despite their experiences during World War 11.96
However, it is often reported that the number of women in the work-
force continued to grow every year following the war.97 This is because
the largest age group of women entering the workforce in the 1950s and
60s was women over age 45-women who had already reared their chil-
dren.9
IV. THE EXCEPTIONS: WORKING CLASS AND BLACK WOMEN
While the majority of white, middle-class, American-born women
were being forced out of the workplace when they became pregnant,
some women were being forced to work during their pregnancies. In
both groups, it is easy to imagine that some women wanted to work,
while some would have chosen not to work if they had been given a
choice. As in other areas of the law, blanket provisions either forcing
women to work or forcing them out of the workplace infringe upon in-
dividual rights and the availability of and opportunity to make choices.
In Colonial America, some women worked as indentured servants,
providing labor for a period of years. If a female indentured servant be-
came pregnant, the man responsible could buy out her remaining
term.9 9 Otherwise, her term would be extended to make up for her re-
duced services during the pregnancy and recovery after the birth, as well
as while she cared for the infant. 00 The fact that these women continued
working while providing reduced services foreshadows the part-time and
flex-time work arrangements that some working mothers desire today.
However, these indentured servants were not given the right to choose
this arrangement. Perhaps not all of them were limited in the services
they were able to provide during the pregnancy, and if they had a choice
they might have preferred not to lengthen their term of service. An in-
quiry into whether the term of service was extended automatically and
96. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 430.
97. RYAN, supra note 75, at 319 ("the bulk of American women would never again revert
to the low level of participation in the labor force that was maintained before the
war."); see also WEINER, supra note 91, at 111 (citing 1944 Women's Bureau survey
that found that 80% of women working in war industries wanted to continue after
the war's end), and 112 (stating that the employment rate of women increased along
with the fertility rate).
98. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 432 ("The women who were entering the work force were
older women; it was the young women who were having the children").
99. KESsLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK, supra note 27, at 9.
100. Id. This extension of service was also intended as a punitive measure.
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consistently to indentured servants who became pregnant and were un-
able to have their remaining terms bought out is beyond the scope of
this Article.
Before the Civil War, slave owners accounted for pregnancies
among slave women in various ways. One reason women were used as
field laborers was because masters did not want to invest in training
them for skilled occupations since "their work lives were frequently in-
terrupted by childbearing and nursing. 1. 1 Whereas generally working
women were thought to endanger their own health as well as that of
their future offspring, some slave owners felt that "'labor is conducive to
health; a healthy woman will rear most children.'" 10 2 Therefore, they
were willing to allow temporary lapses in productivity due to pregnancy
and nursing. 03 Part of their motivation was that the children had finan-
cial value and helped to increase the master's wealth. 0 4 This became
especially important to the slave owners after the importation of slaves
was banned in 1808 and natural reproduction was the only way to re-
plenish and increase the slave population. 5 Female slaves also wanted to
enhance their value in this way, because their fertility made it less likely
that they would be sold and separated from their families. 0 6 Slave
women also received rewards for pregnancy, varying from new dresses or
hair ribbons to relief from work in the fields and extra weekly rations.' 7
Some slave women were given work relief during the final months of
pregnancy on account of their condition, but only after the fifth month
of pregnancy.'08
Not all slave owners were willing to sacrifice immediate profit re-
turns while women were pregnant-they "extracted physical labor from
the pregnant and nonpregnant alike.' 0°9 Some slave owners "forced
women to work in the fields during and after their "confinement"-a pe-
riod of time that might last as long as four to six weeks, or might be
considerably shortened by masters who had women deliver their children
101. Jones, supra note 37, at 18.
102. Id. at 19.
103. Id.
104. KEsSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WoRK, supra note 27, at 10; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY 24-25, 39 (1997); ANGELA Y. DAvis, WoMEN, RACE AND
CLASS 9-10 (1981).
105. DAvis, supra note 104, at 6; ROBERTS, supra note 104, at 26.
106. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 118; ROBERTS, supra note 104, at 26.
107. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 118; ROBERTS, supra note 104, at 25.
108. ROBERTS, supra note 104, at 26.
109. MoRE THAN CHArEL 148 (David Barry Gaspar & Darlene Clark Hine eds., 1996);
see also DAvis, supra note 104, at 9.
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between the cotton rows."" ° In a perversion of the modern notion of
accommodation, masters commonly whipped pregnant slaves by having
them lay face down over a hole that had been dug to provide space for
the protruding belly."'
In the early twentieth century, many black families participated in
sharecropping. Black women often worked in the fields during preg-
nancy. A 1918 Children's Bureau report stated that "to some extent, the
amount of rest a mother can have before and after confinement is de-
termined by the time of year or by the stage of [the] cotton crop. '' 12
Jones attributes low fertility rates among black women during this pe-
riod to "involuntary constraints on normal, healthy childbearing,"
especially the demands of heavy labor in laundries and households
where they worked as domestic servants." 3 In 1896, a black physician
observed that the great number of stillbirths among black women
should not be a surprise:
since they do most of the work that is liable to produce this
state of things[.] They do the cooking, the sweeping, the lift-
ing of heavy pots; they carry the coal, the wood, the water;
they carry heavy burdens on their heads; they do heavy wash-
ing, make beds, turn heavy mattresses, and climb the stairs
several times during the day, while their more favored white
sister is seated in her big armchair, and not allowed to move,
even if she wanted to."
This observation astutely points out the lack of autonomy for both
black and white women-while black women were forced to work,
white women were forced not to.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, many working class
women were employed in factories."' Working class women were not
110. JONES, supra note 37, at 19.
111. Id. at 20. See also ROBERTS, supra note 104, at.39-40, 167; MOPE THAN CrATrEL,
supra note 109, at 27-28; DAvis, supra note 104, at 9.
112. JONES, supra note 37, at 87.
113. Id. at 123.
114. Id.
115. Although the timing might lead one to believe that World War I impacted women's
participation in the workforce, this was not the case. While the war did give women
some opportunity to work in areas where they had previously been shut out, less than
five percent of the women employed during the war were new to the workforce.
KESSLER-HARRis, OuT TO WORK, supra note 27, at 219. World War I did not have as
much of an effect as World War II (discussed supra) because it did not last as long,
and a much smaller number of men were drafted for World War I. DEGLER, supra
note 14, at 419.
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given time off when they became pregnant, nor for recovery after child-
birth. 116 The Brooklyn Pediatric Society advocated a law that would
restrict pregnant workers from employment in factories for a period
immediately before and after childbirth, but the factory commission
passed a bill prohibiting work after childbirth only.1 7 Even still, this law
was not enforced. Baker reports that women did not complain about
working after childbirth, but in fact protested if they were not given
work during the prohibited period."8 One woman reported that her
"working life was interrupted only by the birth of six children, several of
whom she took to the factory to nurse after a brief confinement."" 9 For
these women, economic necessity forced them to work.
V. ACCOMMODATION
Many legal scholars propose that pregnancy should be accommo-
dated in the workplace under a disability model. 20 This is not a new
idea. As early as 1951, a Pennsylvania court stated that "pregnancy must
be treated as a temporary disability, the continuance of which varies
with different individuals." 2' The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA") prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual
with a disability," who "with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment positions that such
116. EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 72, at 102.
117. BAKER, supra note 77, at 257.
118. Id.
119. RYAN, supra note 75, at 209. Ironically, some women today want the opportunity to
bring newborn babies to work to nurse. See Jendi B. Reiter, Accomodating Pregnancy
and Breastfeeding in the Workplace: Beyond the Civil Rights Paradigm, 9 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 1 (1999).
120. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STET-
SON L. REV. 1 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154
(1994); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Ac-
commodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193
(1993); D'Andra Millsap, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A
Proposal To Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1411 (1996);
Laura Schlictmann, Accommodation of Pregnancy-Related Disabilities on the Job, 15
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 335 (1994); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond
the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the
Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
121. Flannick v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 82 A.2d 671, 672 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1951).
2005]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
individual holds or desires."1 22 "Reasonable accommodation" includes
anything from making facilities accessible, to permitting part-time or
modified work schedules. 23 Like other disabled persons, pregnant
women should be entitled to reasonable accommodation. The cases dis-
cussed below show that many women quit their jobs, not because they
became pre nant, but because of inflexible working conditions during
pregnancy.
One such case was brought in Iowa in 1948. The appellant was de-
nied unemployment benefits after she left her job because of sickness
and discomfort due to pregnancy.'25 Although the opinion does not
specify exactly what the woman's complaints were, she may have been
able to continue to work if accommodations had been available. The
Iowa court affirmed the decision, going so far as to state that the
"[c]laimant's case has some analogy to that of one who deliberately
maimed himself to unfit himself for work.' ' 26 Any pregnant woman
would face a difficult challenge going before a court with that view.
A woman who brought suit in Connecticut several years later faced
a similar challenge. After becoming pregnant, Lillian Curry left a job
where she had to climb stairs, but was unable to find other employ-
ment. 27 The court stated:
A pregnant woman, although not ill in the ordinary sense of
the word and not physically unable to work, is in a distinct
category of workers. Her condition generally requires that she
be treated with greater care than the ordinary employee. Her
dependability as to attendance on the job generally may be
doubtful. Her ability to work is always temporary for the rea-
son that it will terminated on a predetermined date, unlike the
ordinary employee ... It is doubtful whether a person in such
physical condition is genuinely attached to the industrial labor
market whether her loss of income when unemployed is due to
the lack of available employment in the market place.
128
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (2000).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (A) & (B) (2000).
124. Schlichtmann, supra note 120, at 357.
125. Moulton v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm., 34 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Iowa 1948).
126. Id.
127. Curry v. Adm'r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 138 A.2d 805 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1957).
128. Id. at 808. The court continued that, "The solution of her problem lies in the field of
maternity benefits, which the unemployment compensation act does not provide."
Note that federal legislation providing maternity benefits was not enacted until 36
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The plaintiff's problem in this case was simply climbing stairs, an activ-
ity that could have perhaps been shared with a more able-bodied co-
worker, if installing an elevator proved to be cost-prohibitive.129 Instead
of addressing the needs of this particular plaintiff, the court decided to
take a broad view and express its opinion that employers are justified in
firing pregnant women who do not quit.
Similarly, two cases from 1961 show instances where a simple ac-
commodation could have helped a pregnant women stay on the job. In
Gearhart v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, a Pennsylvania
court held that "a claimant who was advanced in pregnancy [4 1/2 mo.]
and left her work on advice of her physician that she perform no work
which required her to stand while performing it was properly disquali-
fied for benefits as being unavailable for work within the meaning of the
statute." 3 ° Providing a chair or a stool for her to use was apparently
never considered. In Medwick v. Board of Review, the plaintiff's em-
ployer permitted her to work until the end of the sixth month of
pregnancy."' However, she left work in her fifth month of pregnancy
years after this case, when the Family Medical Leave Act was passed in 1993. But see
Mory & Pistilli, supra note 60, at n. 15 (arguing that the FMLA does not provide real
solutions for women); Greenberg, supra note 9, at 247-49 (discussing the benefits
and limitations of the FMLA for pregnant women).
Connecticut followed the holding of this case in Janello v. Administrator, Unem-
ployment Compensation Act. There, the court dismissed an appeal for a decision
denying unemployment benefits to a woman who had been fired when she informed
her supervisor that she was pregnant. Her anticipated due date was October 27,
1961. She was fired on March 10, 1961. The court decided the employer was justi-
fied because "the availability of the daimant as an employee had become uncertain
and indefinite. Depending on her physical condition, she might have been compelled
or might have chosen to terminate her employment at an early date. Her employer,
because of this condition and situation, determined that it was to its interest to end
the uncertainty... and to train the replacement of its pregnant employee before its
busy season began. There is no finding that this action was not in good faith. It ap-
pears based on valid economic considerations. A pregnant woman, although not ill in
the ordinary sense of the word and not physically unable to work, is in a distinct
category of workers. Her condition generally requires that she be treated with greater
care than the ordinary employee. Her dependability as to attendance on the job gen-
erally may be doubtful. Her ability to work is always temporary, for the reason that it
will terminate on a predetermined date, unlike the ordinary employee's ability to
work." Janello, 178 A.2d 282, 283 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1961).
129. Under the ADA, employers may not have to provide an accommodation if it is found
to create an "undue hardship," for instance, by requiring significant expense. See 42
U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(A).
130. Gearhart v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 168 A.2d 646, 647 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1961).
131. Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 174 A.2d 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
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"because of warm and uncomfortable working conditions."'32 The court
determined that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits because
she left work voluntarily and without good cause.'33 Yet, had she been
provided with a fan, she may have been able to continue working.
One possible reason why accommodation of pregnancy-related dis-
abilities was not considered during this time was because the position of
the medical profession was that women should not work beyond the
sixth month of pregnancy."' This conception remained in place until
1984, when the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific
Affairs recognized that:
Few of our standard medical beliefs about the physical and
emotional characteristics of pregnancy have any scientific basis
... the advice given by generations of physicians regarding
work during normal pregnancy has historically been more the
result of social and cultural beliefs about the nature of preg-
nancy (and of pregnant women) than the result of any
documented medical experience with pregnancy and work...
[women with uncomplicated pregnancies] should be able ...
to continue productive work until the onset of labor.'
One scholar points out that disabilities associated with pregnancy
should be easier to accommodate, since the common symptoms are pre-
dictable.1 6 Some of the most commonly reported conditions (nausea
and vomiting, headache, backache, fatigue, frequent urination, and in-
creasing size) could be easily accommodated by providing breaks and
flexible schedules.1
3 7
Another reason women will be better off with the right to reason-
able accommodation is that if their employers accommodate their needs
during pregnancy, they will be more likely to return to work after the
child is born.'38 They will base their expectations of their employers' atti-
tudes toward working parents in part on how the employers responded
to their needs during pregnancy. At the same time, it is important to
recognize that some women would prefer to leave their jobs during
132. Id. at 252.
133. Id. at 255.
134. Schlichtmann, supra note 120, at 350. See also Finley, supra note 21, at 1133 (criticiz-
ing the "tendency to overgeneralize and to overreact to the supposed frailties of
pregnancy").
135. Quoted in Schlichtmann, supra note 120, at 350.
136. Calloway, supra note 120, at 34.
137. Id. at 7.
138. ScHWARTz, supra note 26, at 58.
[Vol. 12:163
"HAS THE MILLENNIUM YET DAWNED?"
pregnancy, whether or not accommodation was available. Congress spe-
cifically considered this fact: "if a woman wants to stay home to take
care of the child, no benefit must be paid because this is not a medically
determined condition related to pregnancy." '39 Although the Supreme
Court has interpreted the PDA to be an equality statute, it is interesting
to note that Congress contemplated something like accommodation in
its conception of the equal treatment of pregnant women: "The 'same
treatment' may include employer practices of transferring workers to
lighter assignments, requiring employees to be examined by company
doctors or other practices, so long as the requirements and benefits are
administered equally for all workers in terms of their actual ability to
perform work."4'
VI. INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
The best solution to the equality/difference debate may be to aban-
don both strict models in favor of individualized assessment of a
pregnant woman's capabilities and preferences. This approach would
allow women to choose equal treatment in some instances, while also
allowing them the right to reasonable accommodation when needed. As
early as 1949, an Alabama court noted that "a valid public policy exists
to support a separate classification of employees who are expectant
mothers.",141 Other courts also recognized this fact in a number of cases
discussed below.
In 1957, a New Jersey court overruled a collective bargaining
agreement that stated that "[i]n no case shall an expectant mother be
permitted to work beyond the end of the fifth month of pregnancy. '
The plaintiff was employed "as an assembler, solderer and wire stripper,
[which] called merely for the use of her hands while she was seated." 43
The court noted:
[T]here is 'no convincing evidence that employment up to the
time of delivery is harmful provided the physical condition of
the woman is satisfactory and the work is suitable.' The 'better
139. Legislative History, supra note 4, at 151 (Senator Perkins, Report No. 95-948 Prohi-
bition of Sex Discrimination Based on Pregnancy at 5).
140. Id. (Senator Perkins, Report No. 95-948 Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Based on
Pregnancy at 5).
141. Ala. Mills v. Carnley, 44 So.2d 622, 626 (Ala. Ct. App. 1949).
142. Myerson v. Bo. of Review, 128 A.2d 15, 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
143. Id.
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opinion,' ... is to allow the matter to be determined in each
case as it arises, not according to a rigid rule (such as the five
months' rule here) but according to the nature of the work,
the woman's physical condition and the other circumstances
presented by the case. Only five states prohibit employment of
pregnant women in factories and other specified establish-
ments, and then only for the following periods prior to
childbirth [ranging from two weeks to four months] ... The
former statutes provide, generally speaking, for noticeably
shorter periods than the [New Jersey] Unemployment [Com-
pensation] Laws, and it may perhaps be deduced from that
fact that the Unemployment Laws in this respect take into ac-
count something other than society's concern in the worker's
health.
1 4
The court held that her layoff was not voluntary and so she was entitled
to unemployment benefits."'
Two Pennsylvania opinions emphasized that the decision to con-
tinue working should be made by the individual woman, not the
employer. In 1955, beauty shop employee Minnie Niebauer was fired
after disclosing to her employer that she was six weeks pregnant. 146 The
employer admitted Niebauer was fired solely because of her pregnancy.1
47
The employer testified that "she and her partner 'didn't want anything to
happen to her' and added, 'if she slipped and fell, that wouldn't be
good.' ,148 Niebauer argued that "her pregnancy did not affect her work,
that she opened up the shop every morning, was at the shop every day,
took care of her customers the same as she did before her pregnancy and
was never sick.' , The court found that:
We have here a claimant in the early stage of pregnancy, capa-
ble of performing her usual work, who is discharged because
of real or assumed concern for her welfare on the part of her
employers.... [T]here is nothing more substantial than un-
reasonable and formless concern for claimant's safety on the
part of the employers. She was willing and able to perform her
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id. at 15, 17-20.
146. Kugler v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 112 A.2d 453, 453 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1955).
147. Id. at 453.
148. Id.
149 Id
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usual work but was prevented from doing so by her
employers. 50
In a similar fact situation five years later, the same court reached a
different result when the claimant and not the employer raised the con-
cern over the possibility of a slip and fall. In Novak v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, the claimant worked as a general office
clerk for a publishing company."' The court explained that "one of her
duties was to take readings off of the presses, which she did every two
hours. She claims that because of her pregnancy she was afraid that
while making these readings she might fall because the floor around the
presses was slippery."'52 The court denied her benefits, holding that "[i]f
she is to be eligible for unemployment benefits, her conduct must be
consistent with a genuine desire to work, when she is pregnant as well as
when she is not." ' These two cases show that courts did take women's
individualized choices into account when determining willingness to
work.
The equality model demands that pregnant women continue work-
ing without any accommodation. Equality feminists during the second
women's rights movement were "profoundly opposed to traditional con-
ceptions of how families should be organized." 54 These feminists did
not support women who chose to leave the work force upon marriage
and/or pregnancy because they thought this occurrence would weaken
their position. This attitude contributes to the general hostility to the
idea of women balancing children with a career.'55 Furthermore, this
view ignores the fact that even during a "normal" pregnancy, many
women will have different needs than before they became pregnant. 56 If
those needs are not met, the women will be unable to do their jobs as
well as before. This result subverts the interests of the equality feminists
by perpetuating the idea that women do not belong in the workplace
during pregnancy.
Women should have the ability to make the choices that men have
traditionally made to advance their careers, without facing skepticism
that they will fall prey to stereotypes based on women's "natural role."
Likewise, women who choose to leave the workforce when they have
150. Id. at 4 54 .
151. Novak, 164 A.2d 17, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960).
152. Id. at 19.
153. Id. at20.
154. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 98 (1986).
155. See SYLvi ANN HEWLETr, CREATING A LIFE 149-54 (2003).
156. See Schlichtmann, supra note 120, at 357.
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children should be able to make that choice freely, and not because gen-
der inequities give women who earn less than their husbands an
incentive to leave the workplace.'57 Individualized assessment of preg-
nant workers achieved through open communication between women
and employers would allow women to make whatever choices they feel
are necessary to help them achieve their goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that negative attitudes toward pregnant
women working are long entrenched in our history. These attitudes are
still demonstrated today when pregnant litigators face discriminatory
comments from judges in the courtroom,'58 and female firefighters and
EMS workers are advised to have abortions should they become preg-
nant, or they will be fired.'59 The only way to eliminate these problems
is to change underlying attitudes.
Current legislation has had questionable success. The PDA is not
divorced from long-standing negative attitudes toward pregnant women.
It hurts both men and women by symbolically precluding men from
taking full responsibility for pregnancy, and reinforcing the traditional
model that women alone have a duty to bear and rear children. Studies
have shown that "once it is clear that paid parenting leave can be taken
by both men and women.., discrimination against married women in
the childbearing years becomes much less likely."' 6°
It must be acknowledged that changing societal attitudes will be a
painfully slow process. 61 But it is a process that must be undertaken to
achieve any real success with company policies that have been estab-
lished voluntarily, as well as through legislative efforts. Analyzing the
history of these attitudes is the first step in reforming the way people
157. See HEWLETr, supra note 155, at 287.
158. See Sandy Mastro, Note, Courtroom Bias: Gender Discrimination Against Pregnant
Litigators, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 155, 164-65 (2001) (citing comments
such as, " 'you are too pregnant to prosecute"' and "'if your husband had kept his
hands to himself you wouldn't be in the condition you are in"' (quoting Elizabeth A.
Delfs, Foul Play in the Courtroom: Persistence, Cause, and Remedies, 17 WoMAN's RTs.
L. REP. 309, 317 (1996)).
159. See Dana Page, D. C.F.D.: An Equal Opportunity Employer-As Long as You Are Not
Pregnant, 24 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RaP. 9, 24 (2002) (reporting that three women actu-
ally went through with abortions in order to keep their jobs).
160. HEWETTr, supra note 155, at 279.
161. For instance, when Sweden introduced paid parenting leave for both genders, it took
more than twenty years for the percentage of fathers taking leave to increase from 3%
to 80%. See id. at 279-80.
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think about women's roles. Once that happens, women will be more
likely to achieve full participation in the work force instead of being
held back by discrimination. t

